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Abstract 
Fermilab’s Superconducting RF Beam Test Facility 
currently under construction will produce electron beams 
capable of damaging the acceleration structures and the 
beam line vacuum chambers in the event of an aberrant 
accelerator pulse. The accelerator is being designed with 
the capability to operate with up to 3000 bunches per 
macro-pulse, 5Hz repetition rate and 1.5 GeV beam 
energy.  It will be able to sustain an average beam power 
of 72 KW at the bunch charge of 3.2 nC.  Operation at 
full intensity will deposit enough energy in niobium 
material to approach the melting point of 2500 °C. In the 
early phase with only 3 cryomodules installed the facility 
will be capable of generating electron beam energies of 
810 MeV and an average beam power that approaches 40 
KW.  In either case a robust Machine Protection System 
(MPS) is required to mitigate effects due to such large 
damage potentials. This paper will describe the MPS 
system being developed, the system requirements and the 
controls issues under consideration. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The beam at Fermilab’s New Superconducting RF 
Beam Test Facility [1], when operational, will need 
systems to protect critical components from beam induced 
damages such as beam pipe collision and excessive beam 
losses. The MPS must therefore identify hazardous 
conditions and then take the appropriate action before 
damage is caused. Since the loss of a full bunch train can 
result in significant damage, the MPS must be able to 
interrupt the beam within a macro-pulse and keep the 
number of bunches below the damage potential once the 
protection system reacts; the goal is to keep the number of 
bunches on the order of 3-6 bunches. With the high 
possible bunch frequency of 3 MHz this necessitates a 
reaction time in the range of 1-2 µs with cable delay 
included for the 134 metre long machine. The MPS will 
use the status of critical sub-systems and losses measured 
by a fast Beam Loss Monitor (BLM) system, using 
scintillators and photomultiplier tubes (PMT) to identify 
potential faults. Once a fault is observed, the MPS can 
then stop or reduce beam intensity by removing the 
permit from different beam actuators, including the laser 
pulse controller.  
MACHINE LAYOUT 
The machine layout is shown in Fig. 1. The accelerator 
consist of an electron gun, a 40 MeV injector, a beam 
acceleration section consisting of 3 TTF-type or ILC-type 
cryomodules initially, and multiple downstream beam 
lines for testing diagnostics and performing beam 
experiments. The facility will accommodate up to 6 
cryomodules in the final stage. From a machine protection 
point of view, the dump locations shown describe the 
final destination of the beam that traverses a path along 
the beam-line. These paths are termed operation modes 
and are validated by the MPS before the beam permit is 
released. The MPS validates these paths by monitoring all 
critical devices and diagnostics along the path and 
ensuring that they are all in good status and ready to 
receive beam at the requested intensity. 
 The machine will be capable of operating over a wide 
range of beam parameters as long as the total beam power 
remains below the limit of the beam dump capability and 
satisfies radiation shielding requirements. For machine 
protection purposes several beam modes have been 
defined; the beam mode set limits on the number of 
bunches and therefore the intensity.  Initially following 
two modes will be active in the system: 
 Low intensity mode – which allows the minimal 
beam intensity needed for OTR/YAG diagnostics. 
This is below the threshold potential for beam 
induced damage. In this mode there is no fast 
reaction to beam loss within a bunch train. 
 High intensity mode – which does not impose a limit 
on the number of bunches, but enables fast intra-
train protection by the MPS. 
 
 
 
                            Figure 1: Machine layout 
MPS OVER-VIEW 
The simplified overview block diagram of the proposed 
MPS is shown in Figure 2. The MPS has connections to 
several external devices and sub-systems. The top layer 
comprises signal providers such as fast beam loss 
monitors, RF signals, quench protection, toroid 
transmission, vacuum, magnet power supplies and more. 
All devices in this category send status information to the 
MPS logic layer (permit system). Only simple digital 
signals (e.g. on-off, OK-not OK) are transmitted. All 
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devices or subsystems that are determined to be pertinent 
to protecting the machine or necessary for machine 
configuration are included here. The state of the machine 
is determined from this comprehensive overview of the 
inputs and allowable operational modes are determined 
based on this information by the middle logic layer. The 
main goals for the MPS system as a whole are: 
 Provide precise protection of all critical 
components by first determining the fault 
severity (high, intermediate, etc) and then 
taking the appropriate action to avoid damage. 
 Allow for high availability by ensuring that 
the maximum requested beam intensity is 
allowed for the detected fault severity. 
 Monitor MPS components and perform 
periodic self-checks in order to ensure 
robustness and a high level of reliability. 
 Provide well-integrated, user-friendly tools for 
fault visualization, control and post-mortem 
analysis. 
 
 
                             
                             Figure 2: MPS Overview 
 
The permit system part of the MPS is capable of 
handling events on all time scales relevant to the machine. 
This layer is FPGA based and is thus fully programmable 
and handles complex logic task. The logic here will be 
designed to ensure safe operating conditions by 
monitoring the status of critical devices and by imposing 
limits on the beam power. It prohibits beam production or 
reduces the beam intensity by disabling the gun RF and 
the injector laser unless the requirements for the specific 
predefined modes are fulfilled when that mode is 
requested. The final layer of the system shows the main 
actuators. This comprises of all points where the MPS 
logic may act on the operation of the machine and prevent 
beam from being produced or transported; the main 
actuator being the injector laser. When any of the non- 
masked inputs signal an alarm status the MPS permit 
system (logic layer) can do one of several things based on 
the severity of the fault: i.e. switch off the injector laser to 
suppress the production of new bunches, reduce the 
intensity by dialing back the number of bunches, or 
inhibit the rf power from the first cryomodule (CM1) as a 
precaution against transport of dark current from the RF 
gun. 
BEAM LOSS MONITOR SYSTEM 
Several types of beam loss monitors (BLMs) will be used 
for the detection of electromagnetic showers. The fast 
protection system is being designed to interrupt the beam 
within a macro-pulse and will rely heavily on the ability 
to detect and react to losses within a few nanoseconds; for 
this reason the primary loss monitors for fast protection 
are  made of plastic scintillator with photomultipliers 
attached and have already been designed, built and tested. 
Figure 3:  shows some measurement results. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: FBLM showing pulse beam losses 
 
 The BLMs will serve the dual purpose as an accelerator 
diagnostic and as the primary detectors for fast machine 
protection. The monitors must therefore deliver a 
measurement of beam and dark current losses to the 
control system as well as generate a fast alarm signal 
when the beam losses exceed user-defined thresholds. The 
time resolution of the loss measurement must provide the 
ability to distinguish single bunches within each macro 
pulse. This requires a sampling frequency of at least 3 
MHz with a repetition rate of 5 Hz. The BLMs must be 
integrated into a robust beam loss monitoring system 
capable of generating an alarm condition that is derived 
by comparing the outputs of the PMT signals with various 
programmable thresholds. This alarm output is a critical 
component for machine protection. The desire is to 
provide a machine protection trip well before the beam 
can damage accelerator components. If one of the 
programmed thresholds is exceeded or if an error 
condition such as a high voltage failure or failed monitor 
is detected the system should report this to the MPS logic 
which in turn reduces the intensity or inhibits the beam. 
The main requirements for the BLM system are:  
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 Provide both machine protection and diagnostic 
functions. 
 Instantaneous read-back of beam loss 
 Digital output for integrating and logarithmic signal 
(16 bit) 
 Built in self test and onboard signal injection for 
testing of monitors between pulses. 
 FPGA controlled 
 Local data buffer 
 VME interface to ACNET control system 
 Continuous and pulsed monitoring 
 Wide dynamic range 
Cryogenic Loss Monitors 
Although loss monitors are typically one of the main 
diagnostics for protecting the accelerator from beam 
induces damage. Most accelerator facilities do not cover 
the cold sections of the machine with loss monitors. To 
address these issues a Cryogenic Loss Monitor (CLM) 
ionization chamber capable of operation in the cold 
sections of a cryomodule has been developed and will be 
installed and tested [2]. The monitor electronics have 
been optimized to be sensitive to DC losses and the 
signals from these devices will be used to study and 
quantify dark current losses in particular, see figure 4. In 
order to increase the resolution bandwidth and the 
response time of the devices a new scheme which uses a 
Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) based Time-to-
Digital converter (TDC) method is implemented [3] 
instead of a standard pulse counting method. This 
potentially renders these monitors as useful devices for 
both dark current monitoring and machine protection. 
These monitors under consideration are custom built 
detectors. They are an all metal designed which makes 
them intrinsically radiation hard and suitable for operation 
at 5 Kelvin to 350 Kelvin. 
 
Figure 4: reaction of CLM to dark current losses in a 
test beam. 
LASER PULSE CONTROLLER 
One of the main actuators for the MPS is the injector 
laser pulse control. This will be the device that controls 
the number and the spacing of bunches in a macro-pulse 
by picking single laser pulses out of a train. This is 
achieved by manipulating the Pockels cell (voltage-
controlled wave plates). This system is also the main 
actuator for beam inhibits issued by the MPS. It is 
envisioned that this would be a VME board with a fully 
programmable FPGA. It would have inputs for the 
requested beam modes defined by the logic layer of the 
MPS, the MPS permit signal, the 3 MHz machine timing, 
and for a macro-pulse trigger. Based on the laser/gun 
design, it would have control outputs for the Pockels cell 
driver, a mechanical shutter and a first bunch timing 
signal. From the protection system point of view the pulse 
controller is used to: 
 Block the Pockels cell based pulse kickers as long as 
the MPS input is in an alarm state. 
 Enforce the limit on the number of bunches as given 
by the currently selected beam mode. 
 Close the laser shutter on request of the MPS. This 
may happen when there is no valid operational mode 
or when some combination of loss monitors exceed 
thresholds which trigger a dump condition. 
CONTROLS INTEGRATION 
The MPS will need server support for the various 
hardware systems to View, Configure and Diagnose the 
system. Already there are currently several servers under 
development for the beam loss monitor system and the 
laser pulse controller. These servers were implemented 
using the PowerPC 5500 series boards running VxWorks 
6.4 and implementing the ACNET protocol. Some of the 
main requirements for these servers include:  
 Time-stamping at a sub-microsecond 
resolution in order to allow for data 
correlation. 
 Circular buffers that are logged using ACNET 
data loggers and thus provided a repository 
used for post-mortem analysis. 
The integration of the control system with all MPS 
components, from the various front-ends to the high level 
applications, is critical to leveraging the full functionality 
of that control system.  
CONCLUSION 
Significant effort is underway towards developing a 
reliable MPS for this new facility. System integration into 
the complex and commission challenges lay ahead. 
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